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PREVENTING ATOMS FOR PEACE FROM 
BECOMING ATOMS OF TERROR: THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT IS NOT A VEHICLE 
FOR ADDRESSING TERRORISM 
David D. Leege+ 
“Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in 
the eastern United States.  Millions of men and women readied themselves for 
work.”1  By 10:30 a.m. eastern time, the United States had suffered the worst 
terrorist attack to occur on American soil.2  The nation’s sense of security and 
self-confidence had been severely shaken.3  Ten years later, it is evident that 
the attacks of September 11th have forever changed how Americans perceive 
and react to threats.4   
The ramifications of the September 11th terrorist attacks have been  
far-reaching and have resulted in heightened airline security regulations,5 
buffer zones around federal buildings,6 and a persistent public fear that 
manifests itself in response to previously mundane events, such as a plane 
                     
 + J.D. candidate, May 2012, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; M.S. 
Engineering Science, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006; B.S. Materials Engineering, Iowa State 
University, 2003.  I would like to thank David Repka, Partner at Winston & Strawn, for his 
comments and perspective in preparing this Comment.  I would also like to thank the editors and 
staff of Volumes 60 and 61 of the Catholic University Law Review for their hard work in bringing 
this Comment to publication. 
 1. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 1 (2004).  The beginning of the nuclear power program in the United 
States was marked by President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the 
United Nations, in which he promised that the United States would “‘find the way by which the 
miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.’”  
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING HANDBOOK at ix (Kenneth D. Kok ed., 2009). 
 2. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 
311. 
 3. R.W. Apple, Jr., Awaiting the Aftershocks: Washington and Nation Plunge Into Fight 
With Enemy Hard to Identify and Punish, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1. 
 4. See id.; see also  A. G. Sulzberger & Matthew L. Wald, White House Apologizes for Air 
Force Flyover, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Apr. 27, 2009, 10:36 AM), http://cityroom.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/air-force-one-backup-rattles-new-york-nerve (describing the public’s 
reaction to an unannounced flyover of New York, which incited spontaneous reactions and fear of 
an attack). 
 5. See Eben Kaplan, Targets for Terrorists: Post-9/11 Aviation Security, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/11397/targets_for_terrorists 
.html. 
 6. See SHAWN REESE & LORRAINE H. TONG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41138, FEDERAL 
BUILDING AND FACILITY SECURITY 3 (2010). 
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flying over downtown Manhattan.7  Elevated security concerns have affected 
commercial nuclear facilities as well.8  The United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC or the Commission)9 has taken steps to increase nuclear 
security.10  However, citizens’ groups and local governments have called for 
greater action.11  Particularly, these groups have advocated for the inclusion of 
terrorists’ acts in the environmental-impact analysis conducted when the NRC 
issues a new license for a facility.12  This Comment addresses whether the law 
necessitates consideration of the impact of a potential terrorist attack on a 
nuclear facility in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).  
In December 2001, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) applied for a license 
from the NRC to operate an independent spent-fuel storage installation at 
PG&E’s Diablo Canyon Power Plant in San Luis Obispo, California.13  The 
                     
 7. See Sulzberger & Wald, supra note 4. 
 8. E.g., Consideration of Aircraft Impact for New Nuclear Power Reactors, 74 Fed. Reg. 
28,112, 28,112–13 (June 12, 2009) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 52) (requiring nuclear 
facilities to incorporate the capability to withstand impact from aircraft into their design). 
 9. The NRC is responsible for the licensing of commercial nuclear reactors and associated 
facilities.  42 U.S.C. § 5842 (2006).  The federal government is responsible for providing for the 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel.  See id. § 10131(a)(4).  Until the federal government takes 
responsibility for this fuel, utilities must provide interim storage through one of two methods: 
spent-fuel pools or dry-cask storage.  Id. § 10131(a)(5); Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, U.S. 
NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2011).  An 
independent spent-fuel-storage installation is a facility that may be located on a reactor site or on 
a separate site for storage of spent nuclear fuel.  Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations 
(ISFSI), U.S. NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/independent-spent-fuel-
storage-installation-isfsi.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2011).  The two independent  
spent-fuel-storage installations discussed in this Comment utilize the dry-storage method.  See 
Spent Fuel—What Is It and How Will It be Stored, PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE, LLC, 
http://www.privatefuelstorage.com/project/howitworks.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); see also 
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006).  The spent fuel 
is placed into a stainless-steel canister that is welded shut.  San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1021.  
The canister is then placed into a concrete storage overpack, which utilizes passive air cooling 
through the circulation of air.  Id.  The overpack is then placed on concrete pads for interim 
storage.  Id. 
 10. See BACKGROUNDER: NUCLEAR SECURITY, U.S. NRC 1, 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/security-enhancements.pdf. 
 11. See, e.g., EDWARD S. LYMAN, CHERNOBYL ON THE HUDSON? THE HEALTH AND 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR PLANT, UNION 
OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 8 (2004). 
 12. See infra Part I.E (discussing attempts to require the NRC to include a terrorist-attack 
analysis in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)).  The NRC’s issuance of a license is 
considered a “major Federal action[]” under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  
National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).  The NRC is required to assess 
the possible environmental impact and issue an EIS.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (requiring all 
federal government agencies to prepare an EIS along with all “major Federal actions”); 10 C.F.R. 
§ 51.20 (2010) (setting forth instances when an EIS is required, including with the issuance of 
licenses). 
 13. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1021. 
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NRC’s Environmental Assessment (EA)14 set forth a “finding of no significant 
environmental impact” (FONSI).15  Notably, the EA did not consider a 
possible terrorist attack.16  San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, the Sierra Club, 
and an individual citizen appealed the final order of the NRC, alleging that the 
NRC violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to 
include an evaluation of the environmental effects of a terrorist attack in the 
EA.17  The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that the NRC should have included 
terrorist attacks as part of its NEPA review.18 
In July 2005, AmerGen Energy Company, L.L.C. (AmerGen) sought to 
renew its operating license for the Oyster Creek Generating Station in Ocean 
County, New Jersey.19  Again, the NRC did not address acts of terrorism in the 
EIS for AmerGen’s license application, and the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection appealed the NRC’s decision to the Third Circuit.20  
The Third Circuit, disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s San Luis Obispo 
ruling,21 held that the NRC did not have to consider acts of terrorism in their 
NEPA analysis22—creating a circuit split.  This split is likely to expand as a 
result of a challenge brought to a recent NRC licensing decision in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.23 
                     
 14. See infra note 40. 
 15. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1024. 
 16. See id. (noting that although “[t]he EA is not devoid of discussion of terrorist attacks,” 
the NRC had determined that an EA was “not the appropriate forum for the consideration of 
[such] acts”). 
 17. Id. at 1021–22, 1024. 
 18. Id. at 1035. 
 19. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2009).  The Oyster Creek 
Generating Station consists of a boiling-water nuclear reactor used for commercial generation of 
electricity.  OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM’N, GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR LICENSE RENEWAL OF NUCLEAR 
PLANTS: REGARDING OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION—FINAL REPORT 
(NUREG-1437, SUPPLEMENT 1) § 2.0 (2007). 
 20. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 135. 
 21. Id. at 142 (“[W]e disagree with the [Ninth Circuit’s] rejection of the ‘reasonably close 
causal relationship’ test set forth by the Supreme Court and hold that this standard remains the 
law in this Circuit.”). 
 22. Id. at 143. 
 23. Petition for Judicial Review of NRC Memorandum and Order CLI-12-02, Blue Ridge 
Envtl. Def. League v. NRC, 668 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 12-1105). On February 9, 2012, 
the Commission issued an order authorizing the construction and operation of two new reactors in 
Georgia.  Memorandum and Order at 85, In re Southern Nuclear Operating Co., CLI-12-02 (NRC 
Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders 
/2012/2012-02cli.pdf (“The Director of the Office of New Reactors therefore is authorized to 
issue the limited work authorizations and appropriate licenses authorizing construction and 
operation of Vogtle, Units 3 and 4.”).  In less than ten days, several environmental groups filed a 
challenge to the NRC order alleging that the EIS was insufficient.  Petition for Judicial Review of 
NRC Memorandum and Order CLI-12-02, supra, at 2 (“Petitioners contend that in authorizing 
issuance of the [order], the NRC . . . violated the National Environmental Policy Act, . . . [and] 
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Part I of this Comment provides a background of the NRC’s responsibilities 
under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),24 reviews both the NEPA process and 
key judicial decisions interpreting the Act and related regulations, and 
discusses the decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts.  Part II analyzes 
the arguments for and against evaluating acts of terrorism as part of the NEPA 
Process.  Part III argues that, although government agencies should confront 
the possibility of terrorist attacks directly, the NEPA process is not the right 
vehicle to address terrorism, and, in the absence of resolution by the Supreme 
Court, the circuit split should be resolved through agency rulemaking or 
legislative action.   
I.  START-UP SOURCES25 
A.  The Atomic Energy Act 
In the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,26 Congress created the NRC and 
transferred to it regulatory responsibilities previously held by the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC).27  The present form of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (AEA) outlines these regulatory responsibilities,28 and provides that any 
                                                
the Council on Environmental Quality’s regulations.”).   Because the NRC’s final EIS did not 
include acts of terrorism, such as an aircraft attack, the petitioners are likely to raise this omission 
as part of the challenge.  See OFFICE NEW REACTORS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL 
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR COMBINED LICENSES (COLS) FOR 
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 3 AND 4—FINAL REPORT (1 NUREG-1947), at E-
86 (2011). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297g (2006). 
 25. To start up a reactor safely, it is necessary to monitor the number of neutrons in the core.  
When new fuel is used in a reactor, there may be an insufficient number of neutrons for the 
neutron detectors to work properly.  Therefore, a start-up source is used to increase the number of 
neutrons needed for the detectors to work properly.  See NUCLEAR ENGINEERING HANDBOOK, 
supra note 1, at 27. 
 26. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5891 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841(a), 5841(f)–(g).  The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the 
AEC.  Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 2, 60 Stat. 755, 756 (amended 1954).  This Act 
transferred control of the nation’s nuclear program from the U.S. Army’s Manhattan Engineer 
District (Manhattan Project) and placed it under civilian control.  F.G. GOSLING, U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: MAKING THE ATOMIC BOMB 99, 102 (2005).  Later, 
Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which overhauled the 1946 Act and expanded 
the authority of the AEC to include civilian uses of atomic energy.  Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 25, 68 Stat. 919, 925; see also Our History, U.S. NRC, 
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/history.html (last updated May 11, 2011).  Eventually, the AEC’s 
regulatory programs came under attack, prompting Congress to split the promotional and 
regulatory functions of the AEC in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.  Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974 § 2(c); see also Our History, supra.  Congress delegated the 
regulatory functions to the NRC and the promotional functions to the Energy Research and 
Development Administration (now the Department of Energy).  42 U.S.C. §§ 5801(b)–(c), 
5841(f)–(g). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297g-4. 
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commercial possession or use of special nuclear material29 requires a license 
issued by the NRC.30  The NRC is charged with ensuring that licenses are 
granted only when “utilization or production of special nuclear material will be 
in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate 
protection to the health and safety of the public.”31  Accordingly, the 
Commission must refuse to issue a license if it determines that issuing a license 
to the applicant “would be inimical to the common defense and security or to 
the health and safety of the public.”32  The “adequate protection” standard does 
not require absolute protection—some level of risk is acceptable.33  In addition 
to issuing licenses for nuclear materials, the NRC performs its resulting 
functions through rulemaking and adjudication.34  The incidents at 
Chernobyl,35 Three Mile Island,36 and, most recently, the nuclear incident at 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan demonstrate that nuclear 
power is an unforgiving technology, which makes the NRC’s role in regulating 
nuclear materials all the more important.37 
                     
 29. See id. § 2131. 
The term “special nuclear material” means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the 
isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Commission, 
pursuant to the provisions of [42 U.S.C. § 2071 (2006)] determines to be special 
nuclear material, but does not include source material; or (2) any material artificially 
enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source material. 
Id. § 2014(aa). 
 30. Similarly, the NRC also regulates source and byproduct material. Id. §§ 2093(a), 
2111(a).  Source material is material containing uranium or thorium.  Id. § 2014(z).  Byproduct 
material includes material that results from preparing or using special nuclear material.  Id.  
§ 2014(e). 
 31. Id. § 2232(a) (emphasis added).  Courts have interpreted “common defense and 
security” to include safeguarding nuclear material, protecting restricted data, and maintaining 
special nuclear material for national defense.  See Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 781 (D.C. Cir. 
1968).  Additionally, courts have interpreted the public-health-and-safety standard to ensure that 
the applicant is qualified and the design of the facility “protect[s] plant employees and the public 
against accidents and their consequences.”  Id. at 781–82 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d). 
 33. Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Union of Concerned 
Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 114, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).  “Adequate protection” is the 
minimum standard required by statute.  See Union of Concerned Scientists, 824 F.2d at 118.  
Congress has granted the NRC discretion to impose additional requirements on licensees in order 
“to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property.”  42 U.S.C. § 2201(b). 
 34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (describing these grants of authority). 
 35. In 1986, Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station was “the site of the world’s worst civilian 
nuclear power accident.”  HELMUT HIRSCH ET AL., NUCLEAR REACTOR HAZARDS: ONGOING 
DANGERS OF OPERATING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2005), available at 
http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/th/pageFiles/106897/nuclearreactorhazards.pdf. 
 36. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 37. In March 2011, an earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant to shut down and lose cooling capability, damaging the nuclear fuel.  See 
CHARLES MILLER ET AL., U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
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B.  The National Environmental Policy Act 
In 1969, Congress established a national environmental policy through the 
enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).38  Most notably, 
NEPA requires all federal agencies, when proposing a major federal action 
that significantly affects the environment, to provide a detailed EIS in 
connection with that proposal.39 
                                                
ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (2011), available at 
http://pbadpws.nrc.gov/docs/ML/111861807.pdf. 
 38. National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) (setting forth the Act’s purpose 
“[t]o declare national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between 
man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation”). 
  The statute provides six goals for the federal government to adhere to in formulating 
environmental policy: 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for 
succeeding generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally 
pleasing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, 
risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; 
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, 
and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety 
of individual choice; 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high 
standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable 
recycling of depletable resources. 
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added).  The detailed statement must include: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
Id.  NEPA also established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)—an executive branch 
agency that issues rules to implement the requirement that agencies prepare EISs.  Id. §§ 4342, 
4344; e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1–1508.28 (2009).  However, if an agency determines that EIS is 
not required, the agency may instead prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA)—a more 
concise document containing a brief analysis determining either that an EIS should be prepared, 
or that there is no significant environmental impact.  40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9.  The EA 
analysis is used to “[b]riefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to 
prepare an [EIS].”  Id. § 1508.9.  For a finding of no significant impact, the agency will report the 
EA (or a summary of it) and briefly state the reasons why the agency action will not have a 
significant effect on the environment.  Id. § 1508.13.  In this Comment, the process of preparing 
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In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, the 
Supreme Court identified the “twin aims” of NEPA: “The first is to inject 
environmental considerations into the federal agency’s decisionmaking process 
by requiring the agency to prepare an EIS.  The second aim is to inform the 
public that the agency has considered environmental concerns in its 
decisionmaking process.”40  The public disclosure of EISs falls within the 
purview of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which contains an 
exception that restricts the disclosure of classified information.41  Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court held that an agency otherwise required to prepare an EIS 
for consideration in its decision making (the first of NEPA’s twin aims), must 
do so even if the EIS cannot be released to the public (the second of the twin 
aims).42  
C.  Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting “Reasonably Foreseeable” Impacts 
1.  Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy 
Metropolitan Edison Co. owned two nuclear power plants on Three Mile 
Island (TMI) near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.43  On March 28, 1979, while 
TMI-1 was shut down for refueling, a severe accident damaged the reactor of 
TMI-2.44  In response to the accident, the NRC ordered that TMI-1, which 
shared a similar design to TMI-2, remain inoperative until the NRC could 
determine whether the reactor could operate safely without placing the public 
                                                
an EA followed by an EIS if necessary will be referred to as the “NEPA process” or “NEPA 
analysis.” 
In 1983, the Supreme Court clarified that NEPA does not require “agencies to elevate 
environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations. . . . Rather, it require[s] only that 
the agency take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences before taking a major action.”  
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (citations omitted).  Additionally, 
NEPA does not specify agency adherence to a particular decision-making structure.  Id. at 100. 
 40. 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).  In Weinberger, the Navy prepared an EA as part of the 
decision-making process to build a new weapons-storage facility on the island of Oahu, Hawaii.  
Id. at 141.  This facility was capable of storing nuclear weapons, but, for national security 
reasons, whether nuclear weapons are actually stored at the location is classified national-security 
information.  Id.  Finding no significant environmental impact, the Navy did not prepare an EIS.  
Id.  The respondents brought a suit to enjoin the Navy from constructing the facility on the basis 
that the EA did not adequately address the enhanced risk of a nuclear accident.  Id. at 142. 
 41. See id. at 143; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006) (exempting from public release 
“matters that are . . . (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order 
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly 
classified pursuant to such Executive order”). 
 42. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 146.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun noted 
that “[i]f nonclassified data is segregable and properly disclosable . . . it must be released to the 
public.”  Id. at 147 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 43. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 768 (1983).  The 
two nuclear power plants operating at TMI are known as TMI-1 and TMI-2.  Id. 
 44. Id. at 768. 
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at risk.45  To make that determination, the NRC noticed a hearing and invited 
briefing on several issues, including whether to consider psychological harm 
and other indirect effects of a restart.46  People Against Nuclear Energy 
(PANE) responded with a brief arguing that a restart of TMI-1 “would cause 
both severe psychological heath damage to person living in the vicinity[] and 
serious damage to the stability, cohesiveness, and well-being of the 
neighboring communities.”47  After the NRC disagreed, PANE petitioned the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for review of the NRC’s actions, 
contending that NEPA required the NRC to analyze such an effect.48  The D.C. 
Circuit agreed with PANE, and held that NEPA required the NRC to consider 
psychological harm and other effects on the well-being of the community.49 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and analyzed the issue by interpreting 
NEPA’s language in the context of its legislative history.50  The Court 
determined that Congress had designed NEPA to promote human welfare by 
forcing federal agencies to consider only the effects of their actions on the 
physical environment, rather than every effect of the proposed action.51  The 
Court further explained that NEPA requires more than actual or “but for” 
causation for the effect to be considered an environmental effect of an agency’s 
action;52 rather, the Court held that “the terms ‘environmental effect’ and 
‘environmental impact’ in [NEPA should] be read to include a requirement of 
a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical 
environment and the effect at issue.  This requirement is like the familiar 
doctrine of proximate cause from tort law.”53  Therefore, an effect—although 
actually caused by a physical change in the environment—will not be 
                     
 45. Id. at 769 (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 
1) Order, 44 Fed. Reg. 40,461, 40,461 (July 10, 1979)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 769.  PANE was a collation of local residents who opposed the restart of TMI-1.  
Id. 
 48. Id. at 769. 
 49. Id. at 771. 
 50. Id. at 772. 
 51. Id.  The Court noted that the statute centers on the adjective “environmental.”  Id.  To 
interpret Congress’s intended meaning of “environmental,” the Court examined the statements of 
two principal sponsors of NEPA.  Id. at 772–73.  In support of his bill, Senator Henry Jackson 
stated that NEPA is a “congressional declaration that . . . as a government or as a people . . . we 
will not intentionally initiate actions which [will] do irreparable damage to the air, land and 
water which support life on earth.”  Id. at 773 (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969) (statement 
of Sen. Henry Jackson) (emphasis added by Court)).  Representative John Dingell, echoing this 
intent, stated that “[w]e can now move forward to preserve and enhance our air, aquatic, and 
terrestrial environments.”  Id. (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 40,924 (1969) (statement of Rep. John 
Dingell) (emphasis added by Court)).  The Court concluded that Congress chose to promote the 
goals of human health and welfare by pursuing protection of the physical environment as the 
means for achieving these goals.  Id. 
 52. Id. at 772, 774. 
 53. Id. (emphasis added). 
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considered under NEPA if the effect is too far attenuated from an agency’s 
action.54   
Applying this reasonably close causal-relationship test, the Court examined 
the chain of causation that would lead to the psychological-health effects 
alleged by PANE.55  The causal chain began with the Agency’s proposed 
action to authorize renewed operation of TMI-1, which would cause change to 
the physical environment.56  This change would create the risk of another 
accident.57  The perception of this risk by members of PANE and the 
community would then cause the psychological health damage at issue.58  The 
Court concluded that the risk of an accident alone as an unrealized event was 
not itself an effect on the physical environment.59  Therefore, the psychological 
impact on humans based on the fear created by the risk was too far attenuated 
from the Agency’s action to demonstrate the necessary reasonably close causal 
relationship contemplated under NEPA.60 
The Court admonished courts and agencies to draw a manageable line when 
defining a reasonably close causal relationship in light of time and resource 
constraints.61  Otherwise, the Court warned, limited agency resources may be 
spread so thin that the requirements would undermine NEPA’s purpose of 
insuring “a fully informed and well-considered decision,”62 and, consequently, 
agencies would be unable to protect the environment adequately.63    
2.  Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen 
In 2001, President George W. Bush pledged to lift a long-standing 
moratorium on qualified Mexican motor carriers in accordance with U.S. 
obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement.64  To do so, the 
                     
 54. Id.  For example, the Court considered whether out-of-town relatives of local residents 
may claim to suffer psychological health problems as a result of the renewed operation of TMI-1.  
Id.  (“However, this harm is simply too remote from the physical environment to justify requiring 
the NRC to evaluate the psychological health damage to these people that may be caused by 
renewed operation of TMI-1.”). 
 55. Id. at 775–76. 
 56. Id. at 775. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 776. 
 62. Id. (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).  
In this case, for example, requiring the NRC to consider the psychological impacts of its decisions 
would compel the agency to devote significant resources to the development of psychological 
expertise, thereby reducing the resources available for evaluating physical effects on the 
environment.  Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 762 (2004).  Before 1982, Mexican 
motor carriers could obtain a certificate to operate within the United States.  Id. at 759.  However, 
concern with discriminatory treatment of U.S. motor carriers operating in Canada and Mexico 
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Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) issued interim rules on 
March 19, 2002 that provided safety requirements for licensing Mexican trucks 
to operate in the United States.65  As required by NEPA, the FMCSA 
performed an EA of the safety-monitoring rules and found no significant 
impact to the environment.66  Various individuals and groups challenged the 
FMCSA’s rules on the grounds that FMCSA violated NEPA in reaching a 
finding of no significant impact.67  These groups alleged—and the Ninth 
Circuit agreed—that FMCSA was required to conduct an EIS.68   
Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and held that FMCSA had not 
violated NEPA by issuing the rules without considering the impact of 
increased volume of Mexican motor carriers on the environment.69  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court applied the reasonably close causal-relationship test 
articulated in Metropolitan Edison Co.70  Concurrently, the Court included a 
“rule of reason” in its analysis,71 finding that “[w]here the preparation of an 
EIS would serve ‘no purpose’ in light of NEPA’s regulatory scheme as a 
whole, no rule of reason worthy of that title would require an agency to prepare 
an EIS.”72  The respondents argued that although FMCSA had no control over 
the decision to lift the moratorium, the agency’s action should still be 
considered a cause of the increased volume because “but for” the new rules, 
the increase could not occur.73  However, the Court determined that because 
FMCSA had no authority to prevent Mexican motor carriers from entering the 
country, evaluating the environmental impact of their entry would have no 
                                                
prompted Congress to enact a two-year moratorium on new certifications and to authorize the 
President to extend the moratorium to serve the national interest.  Id.  As part of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, the United States agreed to phase out the moratorium in 1992, 
but progress stalled due to concern with Mexico’s safety regulations.  Id. at 759–60.  In early 
2001, following an adverse international arbitration panel ruling, President Bush announced his 
intention to lift the moratorium “following the preparation of new regulations governing grants of 
operating authority to Mexican motor carriers.”  Id. at 760. 
 65. See id. at 762. 
 66. Id. at 761–62.  The EA assumed that there would be no significant change in  
U.S.-Mexico trade volume as a result of the new safety regulations.  Id. at 761.  Rather, the 
FMCSA determined that any increase in trade volume would be a result of the President’s action 
in lifting the ban, and not an “effect” of the rule.  Id.  For this reason, FMCSA did not consider 
any potential environmental impact from an increased volume of Mexican motor carriers in the 
United States.  Id. 
 67. Id. at 762. 
 68. Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1009, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 541 
U.S. 752 (2004). 
 69. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 773. 
 70. Id. at 767 (citing Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 
774 (1983)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  A “rule of reason” allows agencies to determine whether an EIS is required based on 
“the usefulness of any new potential information to the decision-making process.”  Id. 
 73. Id. 
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effect on any action taken by FMCSA.74  Therefore, the Court concluded that 
an evaluation of the motor carriers’ entry failed the reasonably close  
causal-relationship test because the rules issued by FMCSA were not the 
legally relevant cause of the impact of the entry.75 
3.  Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council  
In Methow Valley, the Supreme Court affirmed the regulations of the 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) that concerned properly prepared 
EISs and did not require agencies to analyze worst-case scenarios in a 
particular action.76  The Court agreed that agencies should evaluate only those 
impacts that are reasonably foreseeable without concern for “highly 
speculative harms.”77    
D.  The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of the Reasonably Foreseeable Standard 
Before San Louis Obispo 
Before the Supreme Court’s holding in Methow Valley, the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the “reasonably foreseeable” requirement in two principal cases: 
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble78 and No GWEN Alliance Of Lane 
City, Inc. v. Aldridge.79  In Warm Springs Dam, the petitioners challenged the 
sufficiency of an EIS prepared by the Army Corps of Engineers for the 
                     
 74. Id. at 768.  The Court found that the twin aims of NEPA would not be served by 
requiring an evaluation of an increase in trade volume.  Id.  FMCSA lacks the authority to act on 
the information contained in the EIS.  Id.  Therefore, requiring an impact evaluation would not 
aid in the agency’s decision-making process.  Id.  Similarly, consideration of the impact would 
not serve the policy’s information purpose because the agency could not act on a larger 
audience’s input on the effect of the higher volume.  Id. at 768–69. 
 75. Id. at 769. 
 76. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989).  As part of its 
responsibility to manage the nation’s forests, the Forest Service has the statutory authority to 
issue special-use permits for the operation of ski areas on federal lands.  Id. at 336.  After 
preparing an environmental and financial feasibility study, the Forest Service decided to issue a 
special-use permit for the development of a ski resort on Sandy Butte located in the Okanogan 
National Forest in Okanogan County, Washington.  See id. at 336–45 (describing in detail the 
findings and procedures used in the Forest Service’s analysis).  The Forest Service prepared an 
EIS in conjunction with this decision.  Id. at 338.  Four organizations petitioned for review of the 
Forest Service’s decision, alleging that the Forest Service’s study and its resulting EIS failed to 
meet NEPA’s requirements adequately.  Id. at 345–46.  Although the trial court found that the 
EIS was adequate, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the Forest Service improperly relied on 
speculative mitigation measures when concluding that the impact on mule deer would be 
minimal.  Id. at 340–47.  According to the Ninth Circuit, if the Forest Service lacks sufficient 
information to assess the impact, it must conduct a worst-case analysis.  Id. at 347  (citing 
Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 1987)).  The 
Supreme Court reversed.  Id. at 356. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 79. 855 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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construction of Warm Springs Dam in Northern California.80  The petitioners 
alleged that the EIS was insufficient because it did not consider the 
consequences “of total failure of the dam in the wake of a catastrophic seismic 
event.”81  However, the Ninth Circuit held that “an impact statement need not 
discuss remote and highly speculative consequences . . . . Everyone recognizes 
the catastrophic results of the failure of a dam; to detail these results would 
serve no useful purpose.”82   
Several years later, the Ninth Circuit amplified its view of the reasonably 
foreseeable requirement in No GWEN,83 in which petitioners challenged the 
sufficiency of the EA prepared in connection with an Air Force plan to 
construct the Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN).84  Petitioners 
alleged that the EA was inadequate because it “fail[ed] to discuss 
environmental impacts of GWEN, including the impact of a nuclear exchange 
which might be provoked, at least in part, by the installation or use of the 
GWEN system.”85  However, the petitioners conceded that GWEN’s 
provocation of nuclear war was merely speculative.86  The Ninth Circuit found 
“the contention that GWEN would be a primary target in a nuclear war [would] 
be equally speculative.”87  As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that a nuclear war 
was not a reasonably foreseeable effect of the Air Force’s decision to construct 
the GWEN system because the causal link was too attenuated, and, therefore, 
the impact of nuclear war did not need to be considered in the EA.88 
E.  NRC Actions Before San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC 
Shortly after the September 11th terrorist attacks, community organizations 
and local governments sought to intervene in several ongoing NRC license 
reviews through the NRC’s AEA-mandated public-hearing process.89  These 
                     
 80. Warms Springs Dam, 621 F.2d at 1019–20. 
 81. Id. at 1026. 
 82. Id. at 1026–27. 
 83. No GWEN, 855 F.2d at 1385–86 & n.1. 
 84. Id. at 1381.  GWEN is designed to send messages to U.S. forces during and after nuclear 
war.  Id.  GWEN’s system involves the construction of numerous 300-foot radio towers and “is 
designed to withstand the electromagnetic pulse generated by atmospheric nuclear detonations.”   
Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1386. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit echoed its previous sentiments in 
Warm Springs Dam that “everyone recognizes that [the] effects [of a nuclear exchange] would be 
catastrophic.  Detailing these results would serve no useful purpose.”  Id. (citing Warm Springs 
Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 89. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a) (2010) (providing that “any person whose interest may be 
affected by a proceeding and who desires to participate as a party must file a written request for 
hearing and a specification of the contentions which the person seeks to have litigated in the 
hearing,” and citing the NRC’s standards in determining if the person may intervene). 
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intervenors sought to insure that acts of terrorism were adequately accounted 
for by asking the NRC to address them in the NEPA process.90  
The Commission took action on the first four of these petitions on December 
18, 2002.91  In Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., the NRC laid out four reasons 
why addressing risks of terrorism through an EIS is inappropriate.92  First, the 
Commission argued that the action was beyond the “rule of reason” because a 
terrorist attack on a particular facility is not reasonably foreseeable.93  Second, 
the Commission argued that, “[t]he horrors of September 11 notwithstanding,” 
it is not possible to quantify the likelihood of a terrorist attack on a particular 
facility.94  Furthermore, consistent with Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. 
                     
 90. See, e.g., infra note 92. 
 91. See Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc., 56 N.R.C. 368, 368 (2002); Duke Cogema Stone & 
Webster, 56 N.R.C. 335, 335 (2002); Duke Energy Corp., 56 N.R.C. 358, 358 (2002); Private 
Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 340 (2002). 
  Private Fuel Storage involved Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.’s 1997 application for a 
license to possess and store spent nuclear fuel in an independent spent-fuel-storage installation on 
an Indian reservation in Utah.  Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 47 N.R.C. 142, 157 (Atomic Safety 
& Licensing Bd. 1998).  After the September 11th attacks, the State of Utah intervened in this 
licensing proceeding and contended that the attacks revealed an increased likelihood for a similar 
attack on the proposed spent-fuel installation, which thereby required a NEPA review because 
such an attack was reasonably foreseeable.  Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 345–46. 
  Duke Cogema Stone & Webster involved the Duke Cogema Stone & Webster 
consortium’s February 2001 application to construct a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication 
facility on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Savannah River, South Carolina site.  Duke Cogema 
Stone & Webster, 56 N.R.C. at 337.  MOX fuel—a blend of uranium oxide (conventional fuel) 
and plutonium oxides—serves as means to recycle surplus weapons-grade plutonium and can be 
used by commercial nuclear power stations to generate electricity.  Id.  Georgians Against 
Nuclear Energy sought to intervene and demanded a NEPA review of terrorism impacts.  Id. 
  Duke Energy Corp. involved the Duke Energy Corporation’s June 2001 application to 
renew the operating licenses of four nuclear power plants for twenty more years of operation.  
Duke Energy Corp., 56 N.R.C. at 362.  The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League 
intervened and asserted that renewal of the licenses would increase the likelihood of a terrorist 
attack on the nuclear power plant.  Id. at 361.  In addition to holding that a terrorism review was 
not required for the reasons set forth in Private Fuel Storage, the Commission held that 
contentions relating to terrorism are beyond the scope of a licensing renewal because “a license 
renewal is narrow in scope, confined to aging analyses of the plant’s structures, systems and 
components.”  Id. at 362–65. 
  Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. involved Dominion Nuclear Connecticut’s March 
1999 application for a license amendment to increase the storage capacity of the spent-fuel pool.  
Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc., 56 N.R.C. at 368–69.  Two intervenors, the Connecticut Coalition 
Against Millstone and the Long Island Coalition Against Millstone, asserted that the NRC must 
prepare an EIS evaluating the impact of a potential terrorist attack on the spent-fuel pool and 
assessing the appropriateness of alternatives such as dry-cask storage.  Id. 
 92. Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 347–55. 
 93. Id. at 348–49 (“Here, the possibility of a terrorist attack . . . is speculative and simply 
too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action to require a study 
under NEPA.”). 
 94. Id. at 350. 
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NRC,95 the NRC determined that it could not put forward a meaningful 
analysis of the risk to the environment.96  Third, the Commission argued that 
the “theoretical possibility” of a terrorist attack was “not the same as a 
‘reasonably foreseeable impact’” of such an event; simply assuming that the 
event would occur just because it could occur amounts to a worst-case 
scenario, which the Court in Methow Valley held was not required.97  Finally, 
the Commission maintained its long-held position that discussing security 
vulnerabilities is a matter of national defense that should not be conducted in 
public, and, “in the absence of . . . clear Congressional direction to that end,” 
the Commission will not do so.98   
F.  San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC 
In December 2001, PG&E applied for a license from the NRC to operate an 
independent spent-fuel storage installation at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.99  
The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and eleven other petitioners requested 
to intervene in the licensing process.100  The petitioners made several 
contentions, including an assertion that PG&E’s evaluation “of environmental 
impacts [was] inadequate because it [did] not include the consequences of 
destructive acts of malice or insanity against the proposed [independent  
spent-fuel-storage installation].”101  On the basis of its previous findings in 
Private Fuel Storage, the NRC dismissed the petitioners’ contention.102  The 
                     
 95. In Limerick Ecology Action, the Third Circuit deferred to the NRC’s judgment not to 
consider the risks of sabotage in an EIS when licensing a reactor for operation because “current 
risk assessment techniques could not provide a meaningful basis upon which to measure such 
risks.”  Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 743 (3d Cir. 1989).  Furthermore, 
the citizens’ group challenging the sufficiency of the EIS failed to rebut the NRC’s conclusion 
that the risks could not be assessed.  Id. 
 96. Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 350–51. 
 97. Id. at 352 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 
(1989)); see also supra Part I.B.3. 
 98. Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 355 (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co., 4 A.E.C. 9, 13–
14 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968)).  A NEPA review is a process that involves the public in  both providing comment 
and contesting environmental findings; as a result, it is not the appropriate forum to consider 
matters of national defense.  Id. at 354–55.  The Commission distinguished the holding of 
Weinberger, arguing that a NEPA review might be useful to an agency “that otherwise might not 
consider an issue relevant to licensing,” but would not provide benefit to the NRC, which 
“already . . . review[s] terrorism from every nearly conceivable angle.”  Id. at 356–57. 
 99. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006).  The 
Diablo Canyon Power Plant is located in San Luis Obispo, California.  Id. at 1019–20; see also 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 56 N.R.C. 413, 419 (Atomic Safety & Licensing Bd. 2002). 
 100. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 56 N.R.C. at 419. 
 101. Id. at 447.  Two other environmental contentions (EC-2 and EC-3) also included acts of 
terrorism, but the NRC only considered the terrorism actions as part of the challenge articulated 
in EC-1.  See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 57 N.R.C. 1, 4–6 (2003). 
 102. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 57 N.R.C. at 6.  Before the NRC commissioner’s hearing of the 
petition, the NRC’s Atomic Safety Licensing Board (Board) first reviewed the petition.  The 
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petitioners appealed, alleging that the NRC violated NEPA by not considering 
acts of terrorism in the EA.103 
The Ninth Circuit considered the four reasons articulated by the NRC in 
Private Fuel Storage and rejected each one.104  Regarding the first reason, the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the NRC had relied upon the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Metropolitan Edison to support its contention that an act of 
terrorism was outside the rule of reason,105 but distinguished Metropolitan 
Edison’s proximate-cause analogy from the current case.106  Both cases 
involved three events: “(1) a major federal action; (2) a change in the physical 
environment; and (3) an effect.”107  The court reasoned that in Metropolitan 
Edison the relationship at issue was between points two and three,108 in that the 
portion of the causal chain was too far attenuated between the risk of a nuclear 
accident (a change in the physical environment) and the decline of the 
psychological health of the human population (the effect).109  However, the 
causal relationship at issue in San Luis Obispo was between the first and 
second events—the licensing of the independent spent-fuel-storage installation 
(a federal act) and the risk of a terrorist attack (a change in the physical 
                                                
Board ruled that the environmental report did not need to address acts of terrorism because the 
NRC had implemented a regulation specifically providing that applicants for licenses do not have 
to address acts of terrorism in their application.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 56 N.R.C. at 448 (citing 10 
C.F.R. § 50.13 (2011)).  The regulation provides that applicants for a license or license renewal 
do not need to include design features that would specifically protect against attacks by enemies 
of the United States, including attacks incident to actions against the defense activities of the 
United States.  10 C.F.R. § 50.13 (2011).  However, the Board referred the issue to the 
Commission for consideration.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 56 N.R.C. at 448. 
 103. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1019–20.  The petitioners also argued that the NRC 
violated the AEA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  Id. at 1024.  The petitioners 
alleged, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the NRC violated the AEA’s hearing provisions by 
denying petitioners a hearing on including acts of terrorism in the EIS and a hearing on the 
security measures for Diablo Canyon as a whole.  Id. at 1024–27.   The petitioners also claimed 
that the NRC violated the notice and comment provisions of the APA’s rulemaking requirements.  
Id. at 1027. 
The flaw in Petitioners’ argument is the mistaken assertion that the NRC’s decisions 
were factual and not legal. If the NRC’s conclusion that terrorism need not be 
examined under NEPA were factual, then Petitioners would be correct that its 
determination would have to comply with APA rulemaking requirements, including 
notice and comment, or else the agency would have to permit petitioners to challenge it 
in every proceeding where it was disputed. 
Id.  Because the NRC decided they were not required to evaluate terrorism under NEPA as a 
matter of law, the Ninth Circuit determined that the NRC had complied with the APA.  Id. at  
1027–28. 
 104. Id. at 1028; see supra Part I.D. 
 105. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1029. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.; see also Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 775 
(1983). 
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environment).110  The Ninth Circuit held that the Metropolitan Edison analysis 
did not apply “because it discusse[d] a different type of causation than that at 
issue in this case.”111  Instead, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the appropriate 
standard to apply in San Luis Obispo was the remote and highly speculative 
standard articulated in Warm Springs Dam and No GWEN.112   
Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit determined “that it was 
unreasonable for the NRC to categorically dismiss the possibility of [a] 
terrorist attack . . . as too remote and highly speculative.”113  The court further 
recognized that the NRC’s view was inconsistent with the Commission’s 
efforts to prevent terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities after September 
11th.114  Therefore, the court concluded that “the possibility of [a] terrorist 
attack is not so ‘remote and highly speculative’ as to be beyond NEPA’s 
requirements.” 115 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the NRC’s second factor from Private Fuel 
Storage, finding that the NRC should not exclude acts of terrorism from the 
NEPA analysis simply because a risk is not quantifiable.116  Rather, the NRC 
could conduct a qualitative assessment of the uncertain risk in the absence of 
precise quantification of that risk.117  The court explained that because the 
NRC performs this type of qualitative analysis in other contexts, it should be 
able to apply this analysis to acts of terrorism as well.118  Furthermore, the 
court noted the NRC’s actions in other areas to combat terrorism indicated that 
the NRC found the risk to be significant.119  Therefore, the court concluded 
that the lack of precise quantification did not excuse the NRC from considering 
the significance of such a risk in the NEPA analysis.120   
                     
 110. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1030. 
 111. Id. at 1029–30 (quoting No GWEN Alliance v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 
1988)). 
 112. Id. at 1030.  The NRC had previously determined that a terrorist attack was speculative 
as a matter of law, and, as a result, did not address the petitioners’ factual contentions that the 
probability of a terrorist attack on the power plant would actually increase as a result of the 
independent spent-fuel-storage installation.  Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1030–31. 
 115. Id. at 1031. 
 116. Id. at 1031–32. 
 117. Id. at 1031 (“It is therefore possible to conduct a low probability-high consequence 
analysis without quantifying the precise probability of risk.”). 
 118. Id. at 1031–32. 
 119. Id. at 1032.  The court also pointed to the fact that the Department of Homeland 
Security uses an advisory system that provides a general assessment of the risk of terrorist 
attacks.  Id. 
 120. Id. at 1032 (“This leaves the Commission in the tenuous position of insisting on the 
impossibility of a meaningful, i.e., quantifiable assessment of terrorist attacks, while claiming to 
have undertaken precisely such an assessment in other contexts.”).  The court argued that, even if 
it accepted the argument that the risk must be quantifiable, the NRC failed to demonstrate that the 
risk was unquantifiable.  Id. at 1032. 
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The NRC asserted as its third reason in Private Fuel Storage that evaluating 
terrorist attacks in the NEPA analysis equated to a worst-case scenario, which 
is no longer required under Supreme Court precedent.121  The Ninth Circuit 
agreed “that NEPA does not require a worst-case analysis.”122  However, it 
concluded that in this situation the NRC was not being asked to perform a 
worst-case analysis.123  The Ninth Circuit noted that appropriate worst-case 
analysis, as set forth by CEQ, includes both high- and low-probability events; 
therefore, the distinguishing characteristic of worst-case scenarios cannot be 
probability alone.124  As a result, the court determined that a terrorist attack 
should not escape analysis on the grounds of being a worst-case scenario solely 
because it is of “low or indeterminate probability.”125  Because the petitioners 
“d[id] not seek to require the NRC to analyze the most extreme (i.e., the 
‘worst’) possible environmental impacts of a terrorist attack,” the court 
concluded that evaluating the terrorist attack as part of the NEPA process was 
not a worst-case analysis.126 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the NRC’s fourth contention in Private Fuel 
Storage that it could not comply with the NEPA requirements because of the 
security risks inherent in disclosure of sensitive information.127  In dismissing 
this factor, the court cited to Weinberger as a demonstration that although the 
NEPA process may be modified for national-security considerations, such 
considerations do not exempt an agency from the requirements of the 
evaluation altogether.128 
                     
 121. Id.; see also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 351–52 (2002).  In its brief to 
the Ninth Circuit, the NRC argued that to evaluate the risk and effects of a terrorist attack, the 
Commission would be forced to make a chain of assumptions that would only be theoretically 
possible.  Brief for the Federal Respondents at 40–41, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. 
NRC, 449 F.3d at 1016 (No. 03-74628).  An evaluation would require assuming that a terrorist 
attack would occur, succeed, and cause the release of radioactive materials.  Id.  According to the 
NRC, using a “theoretical possibility” analysis is the equivalent of a worst-case approach because 
it does not rise to the level of a “reasonably foreseeable” impact.  Id. at 41. 
 122. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1033. 
 123. Id. at 1033–34. 
 124. Id  Effects of “low or indeterminate probability” may need to be considered if they have 
significant consequences, “‘provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible 
scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason.’”  Id. 
(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (2010)). 
 125. Id. at 1034. 
 126. Id. (“Instead, they seek an analysis of the range of environmental impacts likely to result 
in the event of a terrorist attack . . . .”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Earth Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 
139, 145–47 (1981)). 
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After rejecting all four of the NRC’s reasons for refusing to consider acts of 
terrorism in the NEPA analysis, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the 
NRC with instructions to consider acts of terrorism in its analysis.129 
G.  New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. NRC 
In July 2005, AmerGen Energy Co. sought a twenty-year renewal on its 
operating license for the Oyster Creek Generating Station.130  The New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (New Jersey) filed a request to 
intervene131 alleging that the environmental report was deficient because it 
failed to consider an aircraft-attack scenario.132  In February 2006, before the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Luis Obispo, the Atomic Safety Licensing 
Board (ASLB) rejected this contention, citing the Commission’s previous 
decisions, in particular Private Fuel Storage.133   
The Commission considered the appeal of the ASLB’s decision after the 
Ninth Circuit had decided San Luis Obispo, and affirmed the Board’s 
decision.134  The Commission disagreed with the Ninth Circuit for the reasons 
articulated in Private Fuel Storage and the Solicitor General’s brief to the 
Supreme Court in San Luis Obispo.135  The Solicitor General had argued that 
                     
 129. Id. at 1035.  This issue was not resolved on remand to the NRC where the NRC staff 
prepared a supplemental EA (SEA) with a finding of no significant impact.  See San Luis Obispo 
Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 635 F.3d 1109, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2011).  Petitioner San Luis Obispo 
Mothers for Peace challenged two NRC actions: (1) the NRC’s refusal to hold a closed 
adjudicatory hearing allowing petitioner’s access to classified and sensitive government 
information, and (2) the NRC’s finding of no significant impact in the SEA.  Id. at 6.  The Ninth 
Circuit rejected both challenges.  Id. at 111.  The court upheld the sufficiency of the SEA, finding 
that NEPA and the AEA did not require the NRC to conduct a hearing in which FOIA-exempt 
information would be disclosed.  Id. 
 130. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2009).  Oyster Creek 
Generating Station is located in Ocean County, New Jersey.  Id.  Commercial nuclear power 
plants are initially licensed for up to forty years, but the license may be renewed for another 
twenty years.  42 U.S.C. § 2133(c) (2006); 10 C.F.R. § 54.31(b) (2010).  The initial operating 
license for the Oyster Creek Generating Station was set to expire on April 9, 2009.  AmerGen 
Energy Co., 63 N.R.C. 188, 193 (Atomic Safety & Licensing Bd. 2006). 
 131. AmerGen Energy Co., 63 N.R.C. at 193. 
 132. See id. at 199–200. 
 133. See id. at 200–01 (citing Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 349 (2002)) 
(holding that New Jersey’s stated basis for intervening—the NRC’s failure to consider the 
environmental impacts of an airborne terrorist attack—fell outside of the scope of the  
license-renewal proceedings). 
 134. AmerGen Energy Co., 65 N.R.C. 124, 126 (2007).  The Commission acknowledged that 
it must follow Ninth Circuit precedent when deciding matters within that circuit, but asserted that 
it was not required to adhere to an unfavorable decision when the same issue is before another 
circuit.  Id. at 128–29 & n.14 (citing United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 173 
(1984)). 
 135. Id. at 129.  PG&E appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Luis Obispo to the 
Supreme Court.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Luis Obispo 
Mothers for Peace, 549 U.S. 1166 (2007) (No. 06-466) [hereinafter PG&E Certiorari Petition].  
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the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to adhere to precedent such as Metropolitan 
Edison and Public Citizen, which established the need for a reasonably close 
causal relationship, analogized by the Supreme Court to the proximate-cause 
analysis used in tort law.136  Additionally, the Commission decided that, even 
if it followed San Luis Obispo, the NRC had already considered the effects of 
terrorism in a generic EIS (GEIS) for license renewal,137 from which it 
“concluded that the core damage and radiological release from such acts would 
be no worse than the damage and release to be expected from internally 
initiated events.”138  New Jersey subsequently appealed the Commission’s 
decision to the Third Circuit.139 
The Third Circuit affirmed the NRC’s decision for two separate reasons: 
First, [New Jersey] has not shown that there is a “reasonably close 
causal relationship” between the Oyster Creek relicensing 
proceeding and the environmental effects of a hypothetical aircraft 
attack.  Accordingly, such an attack does not warrant NEPA 
evaluation.  Second, the NRC has already considered the 
                                                
Despite the NRC’s strong opposition to the San Luis Obispo decision, the Solicitor General 
elected not to file a separate petition for writ of certiorari because no direct conflict existed 
between the circuits and it was unclear how burdensome San Luis Obispo would actually prove to 
be on the NRC.  Brief for the Federal Respondents at 17, San Luis Obispo, 549 U.S. 1166 (No. 
06-466) [hereinafter Federal Respondent’s Brief]. 
 136. Federal Respondent’s Brief, supra note 135, at 6–7.  The Solicitor General, 
characterized the Ninth Circuit’s decision as “unprecedented” and argued that the decision 
created a tension in the law.  Id. at 6.  Furthermore, the Solicitor General contended that the 
decision could become “highly disruptive for [the] NRC (and perhaps other federal agencies).”  
Id. at 14. 
 137. The NRC has developed a GEIS for license renewal of existing plants.  See OFFICE OF 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, GENERIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR LICENSE RENEWAL OF NUCLEAR PLANTS: MAIN 
REPORT (NUREG-1437) (1996) [hereinafter GEIS FOR LICENSE RENEWAL].  This GEIS has three 
primary objectives: 
(1) to provide an understanding of the types and severity of environmental impacts that 
may occur as a result of license renewal of nuclear power plants under 10 CFR Part 54, 
(2) to identify and assess those impacts that are expected to be generic to license 
renewal, and (3) to support a rulemaking (10 CFR Part 51) to define the number and 
scope of issues that need to be addressed by the applicants in plant-by-plant license 
renewal proceedings. 
Id. at Abstract.  Site-specific EISs are prepared as part of the license-renewal process and 
supplement the GEIS.  See id. §§ 1.73–1.76.  Notably, the GEIS provides: 
Although the threat of sabotage events cannot be accurately quantified, the commission 
believes that acts of sabotage are not reasonably expected.  Nonetheless, if such events 
were to occur, the commission would expect that resultant core damage and 
radiological releases would be no worse than those expected from internally initiated 
events. 
Id. § 5.3.3.1. 
 138. AmerGen Energy Co., 65 N.R.C. at 131 (2007) (quoting AmerGen Energy Co., 63 
N.R.C. 188, 201 n.8 (Atomic Safety & Licensing Bd. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 139. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 133 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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environmental effects of a hypothetical terrorist attack on a nuclear 
plant and found that these effects would be no worse than those 
caused by a severe accident.140 
Citing Metropolitan Edison and Public Citizen, the Third Circuit used tort 
law’s proximate-cause analysis to inform its decision that the causal nexus 
between the agency action (NRC’s renewal of a license) and the purported 
effect (aircraft attack on a nuclear facility) is too attenuated to satisfy the 
reasonably close causal-relationship test.141  Just as the FMCSA had no 
authority to prevent the effect in Public Citizen, the NRC lacks control of the 
airspace above the facilities it regulates.142  From this the court reasoned that 
an airborne attack on the Oyster Creek Generating Station could only result 
from “at least two intervening events: (1) the act of a third-party criminal and 
(2) the failure of all government agencies specifically charged with preventing 
terrorist attacks.”143  Applying tort causation concepts, the court determined 
that an airborne terrorist attack (third-party criminal act) would be a 
superseding cause, thus intervening as the legally relevant cause of any 
environmental effect resulting from the attack.144  Therefore, the Third Circuit 
concluded that an environmental impact would not be the result of a major 
federal action subject to NEPA.145 
In further support of this conclusion, the Third Circuit noted that the 
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison had admonished courts to draw a line 
for imposing NEPA responsibilities in a way manageable for the agencies.146  
According to the Third Circuit, drawing this line to include assessing the 
consequences of an airborne attack would require the NRC to “spend time and 
resources assessing security risks over which it has little control and which 
would not likely aid its other assigned functions to assure the safety and 
security of nuclear facilities.”147   
The Third Circuit also determined that the NRC had already considered the 
effects of a terrorist attack in the GEIS for License Renewal of Nuclear 
Plants.148  Furthermore, the court held that New Jersey had not met its burden 
                     
 140. Id. at 136 (citations omitted). 
 141. See id. at 139–40. 
 142. Id. at 139 (discussing how the Supreme Court in Public Citizen declined to find a 
reasonably close causal relationship because the Agency, FMCSA, lacked control over the 
volume of Mexican motor carriers in the United States); cf. supra Part I.C.2. 
 143. Id. at 140. 
 144. Id. at 140–41 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 442, 448 (1965)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 147 (citing Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 
774 n.7 (1983)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 143; see also supra note 138.  The Third Circuit found the analysis in a GEIS 
to be an appropriate means for conducting the EIS.  N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139 
(citing Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, Inc. 462 U.S. 87, 101 (1983)).  Additionally, the court 
deemed it improper to challenge the GEIS analysis in an adjudicatory hearing because the NRC 
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of demonstrating “that the NRC could [have] evaluate[d] the risks more 
meaningfully than it already ha[d] done.”149  Because the Third Circuit 
concluded that NEPA did not require an assessment of possible terrorist 
attacks, and that even if it did, the NRC had already sufficiently evaluated 
those impacts, the court affirmed the NRC’s decision.150 
H.  The NRC Addresses Acts of Terrorism Outside of NEPA 
Pursuant to its responsibility under the AEA,151 the NRC has enacted rules 
requiring licensees to protect themselves against certain acts of radiological 
sabotage, including terrorism.152  The regulations provide for two general 
requirements for securing special nuclear material and the plants that use it: (1) 
specific physical protection requirements,153 and (2) a requirement that the 
overall safeguard systems protect against specific design-basis threats set forth 
in the regulations.154   
The NRC requires a licensee to have security measures capable of repelling 
an attack on the facility.155  The NRC’s design-basis threats simulate the 
magnitude of a potential attack to test the strength of the facility’s security.156  
The NRC has updated the design-basis threats in response to anticipated 
changes in the types of attacks against the United States.157  The next several 
paragraphs chronicle the NRC’s modifications to the design-basis threats since 
the early 1990s. 
The design-basis threats were initially very limited in scope, and “protected 
only against industrial sabotage by individuals and groups with possible inside 
information and hand-held weapons.”158  In response to a vehicle intrusion 
                                                
had codified the GEIS in rulemaking.  Id.  Lastly, the court recognized that the site-specific EIS 
had properly assessed the alternatives to mitigate severe accidents.  Id. at 143–44. 
 149. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 144. 
 150. Id. at 143–44. 
 151. See supra Part I.A. 
 152. See 10 C.F.R. § 73.1 (2010). 
 153. Id. § 73.1(a); see, e.g., id. § 73.55 (providing the requirements for physical protection of 
licensed activities).  Physical-protection requirements include erecting physical barriers,  
§ 73.55(e)(1)(i), maintaining access controls, § 73.55(g)(1), and establishing search programs,  
§ 73.55(h)(1).  The regulations also specifically require bullet-resistant barriers around the reactor 
control room, § 73.55(e)(5), an isolation zone around the perimeter of the facility, § 73.55(e)(7), 
and vehicle-control measures (both water and land), § 73.55(e)(10). 
 154. 10 C.F.R. § 73.1(a). 
 155. See MARK HOLT & ANTHONY ANDREWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34331, 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY AND VULNERABILITIES 1 (2010). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1–2. 
 158. See Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2009) (tracing the origins of the 
design-basis-threat rules); see also Requirements for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Power 
Reactors, 42 Fed. Reg. 10,836, 10,836–40 (Feb. 24, 1977) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 73) 
(adopting the NRC’s 1977 final rules for the protection of nuclear facilities against security 
threats). 
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incident at TMI and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the NRC 
subsequently amended the design-basis-threat rules in 1994.159   
Following the September 11th attacks, the NRC took several actions to 
address the security of nuclear power plants.160  In the immediate aftermath of 
the attacks, the NRC issued advisories to licensed facilities aimed at 
heightening their security and ability to respond effectively to an attack.161  
Although licensees voluntarily took action in response to the threat advisories, 
in March of 2002, the NRC issued an order mandating additional safeguards 
beyond the regulatory requirements because of the high-level threat 
environment.162   
The NRC has taken specific action to strengthen the design-basis-threat rule 
and established the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response to 
oversee these changes.163  In 2004, as part of its design-basis-threat 
improvements, the NRC began requiring “force-on-force” security exercises at 
each nuclear power plant every three years.164  The NRC approved a final rule 
revising the design-basis-threat rule on March 19, 2007.165  Although specific 
                     
 159. See Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 38,889, 38,889 (Aug. 1, 1994) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 73) (revising the design-basis-threat 
rules to include a possible attack by land vehicle, including the use of a land-vehicle bomb).  The 
new rules required licensees to provide defensive capabilities to meet these threats.  Id. at 38,900.  
For example, licensees were required to perform bomb-blast analyses, establish barriers to control 
vehicle access, and provide equipment necessary to prevent radiological releases.  Id. at 
 38,899–90. 
 160. See Order Modifying Operating Power Reactor Licenses, 67 Fed. Reg. 9792, 9792 (Mar. 
4, 2002) (providing immediate security measures for nuclear facilities in the wake of September 
11th). 
 161. Id.  As a result of these advisories, the facilities moved to the highest level of security 
and “increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, added security posts, installed 
additional physical barriers, increased the standoff distance for vehicle checks, enhanced 
coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and imposed more restrictive site 
access controls for all personnel.”  Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 343–44 (2002) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 162. Order Modifying Operating Power Reactor Licenses, 67 Fed. Reg. at 9792. 
 163. See HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 2. 
 164. Id.  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 codified the force-on-force exercise requirements: 
(1) The security evaluations shall include force-on-force exercises. 
(2) The force-on-force exercises shall, to the maximum extent practicable, simulate 
security threats in accordance with any design-basis threat applicable to a facility. 
(3) In conducting a security evaluation, the Commission shall mitigate any potential 
conflict of interest that could influence the results of a force-on-force exercise, as the 
Commission determines to be necessary and appropriate. 
Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 651(a)(1), § 170D(b), 119 Stat. 594, 799 (codified at 42 U.S.C.  
§ 2210d(b) (2006)). 
 165. See Design Basis Threat, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,705, 12,705 (Mar. 19, 2007) (codified at 10 
C.F.R. pt. 73).  In enacting the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress required the NRC to revise 
the design-basis threat through rulemaking.  Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 651(a)(1),  
§ 170E(a), 119 Stat. at 799.  The Act provided a non-exhaustive list of potential factors for the 
NRC to consider in its rulemaking, including: 
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details of the revised design-basis threats remain classified,166 the revised 
model strengthened the assumed capabilities of adversaries, their equipment, 
their tactics, and their resolve.167  The NRC excluded an air-based attack from 
the design-basis threat, concluding that a private security force could not 
reasonably be expected to defend against such an attack168—that responsibility 
rests with other federal entities.169 
                                                
(1) the events of September 11, 2001; 
(2) an assessment of physical, cyber, biochemical, and other terrorist threats; 
(3) the potential for attack on facilities by multiple coordinated teams of a large number 
of individuals; 
(4) the potential for assistance in an attack from several persons employed at the 
facility; 
(5) the potential for suicide attacks; 
(6) the potential for water-based and air-based threats; 
(7) the potential use of explosive devices of considerable size and other modern 
weaponry; 
(8) the potential for attacks by persons with a sophisticated knowledge of facility 
operations; 
(9) the potential for fires, especially fires of long duration; 
(10) the potential for attacks on spent fuel shipments by multiple coordinated teams of a 
large number of individuals; 
(11) the adequacy of planning to protect the public health and safety at and around 
nuclear facilities, as appropriate, in the event of a terrorist attack against a nuclear 
facility; and 
(12) the potential for theft and diversion of nuclear materials from such facilities. 
Id. at sec. 651(a)(1), § 170E(b), 119 Stat. at 800. 
 166. Design Basis Threat, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12,706. 
 167. See HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 3. 
 168. Design Basis Threat, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12,710. 
 169. Id. at 12,710.  Shortly after its enactment, several petitioners challenged the revised 
design-basis-threat rule in the Ninth Circuit.  Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 917 (9th Cir. 
2009).  The Petitioners—Public Citizen Inc., San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace, the State of 
New York, and amicus State of California—claimed that the “Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously and contrary to law by refusing to include the threat of air attacks in the final revised 
[design-basis-threat] rule” and that the Commission violated NEPA “by not considering the risk 
of an airborne terrorist attack in its [EA].”  Id. at 917–18.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed and upheld 
the NRC’s actions.  Id. at 918.  The court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious to limit 
the scope of the design-basis rule to reasonable expectations of private security forces’ 
capabilities.  Id. at 929.  Similarly, the court asserted the following in support of its finding that 
the NRC sufficiently considered the threat of airborne attacks: 
  It is not implausible for the Commission to determine that most attacks will be 
prevented in the first instance by the coordinated efforts of multiple federal agencies.  It 
is also not implausible, based on the evidence before the Commission, for the NRC to 
conclude that, in the event that an airplane is able to strike a facility, the mitigative and 
protective measures imposed through the [design basis threat] Orders and the revised 
[design-basis-threat] would likely prevent any serious harm from occurring. 
Id. at 926.  From these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the NEPA claim, finding that the 
NRC had discretion to exclude air-based threats from the scope of the design-threat rule and, 
consequently, the NRC was not required to consider the impact of that decision in the EA.  Id. at 
928–29. 
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II.  ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ASSESSING ACTS OF TERRORISM IN AN EIS 
The reasons advanced for not including acts of terrorism in a NEPA analysis 
are threefold.  First, a terrorism evaluation as part of the NEPA analysis does 
not add anything to the decision-making process for the agency.  Second, acts 
of terrorism are beyond the rule of reason applied to determine the events that 
need to be considered.  Third, the NEPA process is not suitable for sensitive 
security issues.  This Part addresses each of these arguments in turn. 
A.  The NRC Does Not Benefit from Evaluating Terrorism in a NEPA Analysis. 
The NRC maintained that it would not benefit from further study of these 
issues under NEPA because it already adequately addressed the matter through 
current obligations under the AEA and its ongoing efforts to ensure the 
security of nuclear power plants.170  The security threat to nuclear facilities is 
continually evolving, while the force-on-force exercises continue to expose 
security vulnerabilities.171  In order for the NRC to fulfill its obligations under 
the AEA to ensure the common defense and security and provide adequate 
protection to the health and safety of the public,172 the NRC continually 
updates the security of nuclear facilities by issuing orders and revising the 
regulations.173  A NEPA review of the security at nuclear facilities would not 
add to this continuous evaluation.  Additionally, the NEPA process lacks the 
flexibility that providing nuclear security requires.174  A NEPA evaluation 
considers only a snapshot of the potential environmental impact at the 
particular time of the decision.175  Therefore, evaluating acts of terrorism under 
                     
 170. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 356–57 (2002) (“Thus, even if 
terrorism were a matter cognizable under NEPA . . . it would elevate form over substance to insist 
that [the NRC] supplement [its] ongoing comprehensive review with a duplicative or formalistic 
NEPA study.”). 
 171. Id. at 342. 
 172. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2006). 
 173. See, e.g., Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 
Fed. Reg. 38,889, 38,889 (Aug. 1, 1994) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 73) (promulgating a final rule 
requiring nuclear facilities to protect against the new threat of attack via land vehicles); see also 
Order Modifying Operating Power Reactor Licenses, 67 Fed. Reg. 9792, 9792 (Mar. 4, 2002) 
(providing immediate security measures after September 11th). 
 174. See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting 
how analysis of nuclear security risks implicates decisions broader than those contemplated by 
NEPA, and how these decisions must be centralized, not made on a site-specific basis). 
 175. NEPA requires a site-specific analysis of environmental impacts.  See id.  Advocates for 
including terrorism in the site-specific EIS have focused on the uniqueness of each plant—for 
example, reactor type and proximity to population centers—when considering the effects of an 
attack.  See, e.g., Amanda Mott, Comment, Should the Threat of a Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear 
Power Plant be Considered Under NEPA Review?, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 333, 
336–37 (2007).  However, as the Third Circuit noted in New Jersey, a comprehensive terrorism 
analysis is not manageable under the limited scope of a NEPA review.  N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
561 F.3d at 141. 
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NEPA would violate the “rule of reason” because doing so would not aid in the 
decision-making process.176 
However, critics of the NRC’s position argue that excluding these actions 
from the NEPA process would be inconsistent with NEPA’s aim to inform the 
public that an agency has considered environmental impacts in its decision.177  
This position ignores the fact that the public may already be properly informed 
of the NRC’s actions to assess terrorist risks outside of the NEPA process 
without disclosing confidential information.178  Although the public is not 
informed of every detail of the NRC’s security requirements or of the  
design-basis threats for security purposes, the public nature of the rulemaking 
process offers assurances to the public that the NRC is addressing the threat of 
terrorism in accordance with their obligations under the AEA.179 
Critics, such as the Ninth Circuit in San Luis Obispo, also point out that 
“compliance with the AEA does not excuse the [NRC] from its NEPA 
obligations.”180  However, this statement of law is moot because, as this 
Comment sets forth, the NRC is not required to consider terrorist acts to meet 
its NEPA obligations.181  NEPA evaluations are “supplementary” to the NRC’s 
responsibilities under the AEA, rather than duplicative.182  As the Supreme 
Court stated in Public Citizen, the “rule of reason” allows agencies to 
determine if, and to what extent, they are required to perform an EIS based on 
the utility of any new information the agency might obtain from the EIS for the 
decision-making process.183  Furthermore, because the NRC continually uses 
the rulemaking process to update and enforce design-basis threats, a NEPA 
analysis would provide no new information.184  As a result of the security 
requirements and enforcement efforts the NRC has undertaken pursuant to the 
AEA, an additional NEPA review is duplicative and unnecessary. 
                     
 176. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (characterizing the “rule 
of reason” as a limitation on the scope of NEPA review based on the usefulness of potential 
information). 
 177. See Michael Hill, Note, NEPA at the Limits of Risk Assessment: Whether to Discuss a 
Potential Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power Plant Under the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3007, 3045 (2010) (arguing that taking action outside of NEPA is 
insufficient until the public has been properly informed through the NEPA process). 
 178. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 356 (2002) (describing numerous other 
efforts taken by the NRC to address risks of terrorism). 
 179. See, e.g., Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, 59 
Fed. Reg. 38,889, 38,889 (Aug. 1, 1994) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 73) (discussing numerous 
public comments submitted during the NRC rulemaking process). 
 180. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 181. See infra Part III.A. 
 182. See 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (2006). 
 183. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004); see also Metro. Edison Co. 
v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 n.7 (1983); supra Part I.C.1. 
 184. See supra Part I.H. 
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B.  NEPA’s Rule-of-Reason Analysis 
As recognized by courts and agencies alike, the rule of reason governs the 
application of NEPA.185  Although this rule is susceptible to a number of 
different formulations,186 these formulations can be reduced to three 
categories: (1) the proximate-cause approach from Metropolitan Edison and 
Public Citizen, (2) a reasonably foreseeable standard, and (3) the proposition 
that agencies are not required to prepare a worst-case analysis.187 
1.  Applicability of Metropolitan Edison and the Proximate-Cause Argument 
The Third and Ninth Circuits both argue that their decisions are consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Metropolitan Edison.188  According to 
the Ninth Circuit in San Luis Obispo, the proximate-cause analysis in 
Metropolitan Edison only applies to the causal link between a change in the 
physical environment and a purported effect of that change, which is separate 
from, and inapplicable to, the causal link between an agency action and the 
change in the environment.189  Although the words of Metropolitan Edison 
could be read in this narrower manner,190 the Supreme Court’s application of 
the proximate-cause test in Public Citizen—as the Third Circuit pointed out in 
New Jersey—does not support the Ninth Circuit’s limited approach.191   
In Public Citizen, a unanimous Supreme Court applied the proximate-cause 
test between the agency action and the change in the environment.192  The 
                     
 185. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767–68; Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 367–68 
(D.C. Cir. 2000); see also National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or 
Unavailable Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,621 (Apr. 25, 1986) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 
1502) (“The rule of reason is basically a judicial device to ensure that common sense and reason 
are not lost in the rubric of regulation.”). 
 186. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 348–49 (2002) (discussing the multiple 
formulations of the rule of reason in the context of NEPA, including a pure analysis of 
“reasonably foreseeable” impacts, a rule of reasonableness excluding “‘remote and speculative’ 
impacts or ‘worst-case’ scenarios,” a rule of reasonableness excluding impacts with “a low 
probability of occurrence,” and an analysis requiring the “federal action to be the ‘proximate 
cause’ of [the] impact” (footnotes omitted)). 
 187. See infra Part II.A.1–3. 
 188. Compare N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 139–40, 142 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2009) (following Metropolitan Edison), with San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 
F.3d 1016, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing Metropolitan Edison). 
 189. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1029; see supra Part I.F. 
 190. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (“[T]he 
terms ‘environmental effect’ and ‘environmental impact’ . . . [should] be read to include a 
requirement of a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical 
environment and the effect at issue.” (emphasis added)). 
 191. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139, 142 n.10 (noting that the Ninth Circuit 
made no reference to Public Citizen). 
 192. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767–68 (2004).  In Public Citizen, the 
FMCSA’s issuance of interim rules concerning the safety regulations for Mexican motor carriers 
was the agency action.  Id. at 760, 768.  The increased volume of Mexican motor carriers in the 
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Court held that the Agency’s issuance of regulations was not the cause of the 
change in the environment because the Agency lacked the ability to prevent 
change; rather, the President was the proximate cause because he alone could 
authorize motor-carrier entry.193  Likewise, the NRC’s decision to exclude 
potential airborne attacks from NEPA review could not be the proximate cause 
of the environmental effects of such an attack because the NRC lacks the 
ability to prevent an airborne attack.194  The NRC cannot prevent these types of 
airborne attacks because of two intervening causes: the extraordinary act of a 
third-party criminal, and some failure on the part of agencies responsible to 
prevent terrorism.195  Therefore, applying the proximate-cause test consistent 
with Public Citizen, no reasonably close causal relationship existed between 
the NRC’s licensing action and the change in the physical environment.196 
                                                
United States was the damage to the environment.  Id. at 761, 768.  The environmental  
effect—increased pollution due to exhaust—was a purported result of this increased presence of 
Mexican trucks.  Id. 
 193. Id. at 770. 
 194. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139–40.  The NRC does not control the airspace 
above the facilities it regulates; rather, Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
hold that responsibility.  Id. at 137.  Additionally, the NRC has specifically explained its limited 
ability to face an airborne threat. Id. 
 195. Id. at 140.  The Third Circuit analogized to the tort principle that a superseding cause 
breaks the causal link between a negligent act and a resulting injury.  Id.  In tort law, a negligent 
defendant generally will not be held liable for injury caused by an intervening criminal act.  See 
id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 142 (1965)).  Therefore, by analogy, a criminal act 
of terrorism on a nuclear facility would function as a superseding cause, severing any causal link 
between the NRC’s licensing action and the impact of the terrorist attack.  Id. at 140–41.  
However, the Third Circuit acknowledged that there are some situations in which a third-party 
criminal act will not be a superseding cause.  Id. at 140 (“[A]n actor should anticipate third-party 
criminal conduct [in] . . . situations ‘created at a place where persons of peculiar vicious type are 
likely to be’ who might yield to the temptation, even though the average individual would not do 
so.” (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 cmt. b)).  After 
considering the 1965 Restatement’s six factors used to determine if an intervening act is a 
superseding cause, the Third Circuit concluded that an act of terrorism on a nuclear facility is a 
superseding cause.  Id. at 140–41 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442). 
  Two commentators have criticized the Third Circuit’s six-factor analysis.  See Amanda 
Lopez, Note, NEPA in the Post-9/11 World, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 423, 443 (2010); Ben Schifman, 
Note, The Limits of NEPA: Consideration of the Impacts of Terrorism in Environmental Impact 
Statements for Nuclear Facilities, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 373, 400–01 (2010). Both 
commentators argue that the NRC already anticipates or should anticipate that terrorists “might 
avail themselves of the opportunity to attack a nuclear power facility.”  Schifman, supra, at 400; 
see also Lopez, supra, at 443.  However, whether the terrorist will take advantage of the 
opportunity is not the relevant concern to NEPA; rather, NEPA analysis considers whether—in 
light of the NRC’s actions under the AEA and other government actions—the attack will succeed.  
See infra Part II.B.2. 
 196. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 140–41.  Critics of a proximate-cause approach to 
NEPA argue that proximate cause in tort law is backward-looking regarding liability, rather than 
forward-looking as in NEPA; therefore, the tort concept is inapplicable.  Hill, supra note 177, at 
3048; see also Schifman, supra note 195, at 400–01. 
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In addition to ignoring Public Citizen,197 the Ninth Circuit failed to consider 
the relevant decisions of the other circuit courts of appeal.198  In a factually 
similar case, the Eighth Circuit affirmed an agency’s refusal to reopen the EIS 
comment period for consideration of terrorist attacks following September 11th 
reasoning that any “increased threat was general in nature and did not bear 
specifically on [the project at issue in the case].”199  Additionally, the D.C. 
Circuit, citing the Supreme Court’s proximate-cause test in Metropolitan 
Edison, stated that the NEPA analysis should not consider actions of “deranged 
criminal[s]” when assessing environmental impacts.200  In a similar fashion, 
the Second Circuit upheld the Department of Transportation’s refusal to 
consider the effects of sabotage on the shipment of large quantities of 
radioactive material on highways because “the risks of sabotage were too far 
afield for consideration.”201  As demonstrated above, these decisions leave the 
Ninth Circuit alone in holding that the environmental impacts of terrorist, or 
otherwise criminal actions require consideration under NEPA. 
                     
 197. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 142 n.10; see San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 
v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1028–31 (9th Cir. 2006) (failing to consider the Public Citizen decision 
in its analysis). 
 198. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 142–43 (acknowledging other circuit 
decisions in which the courts disagreed with the San Luis Obispo holding); PG&E Certiorari 
Petition, supra note 135, at 22. 
 199. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 543–44 (8th Cir. 
2003).  The Mid States Coalition petitioners challenged the decision of the Surface Transportation 
Board to approve a new rail line and upgrades to existing rail lines through Minnesota and South 
Dakota.  Id. at 532.  The petitioners had requested that the Board reopen comments on the draft 
EIS after the comment period had closed but before the Agency’s decision, but the Board 
concluded that additional proceedings were not warranted.  Id. at 544.  In response, one petitioner 
contended that the Board had violated NEPA by failing to reopen the commentary period to 
account for terrorist attacks in the Board’s EIS.  Id. at 543–44. 
 200. Glass Packaging Inst. v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The Glass 
Packaging Institute challenged a decision by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(ATF) to allow the packaging and sale of liquor in plastic bottles.  Id. at 1084.  The Glass 
Packaging Institute contended that, as a part of the EIS, ATF should have considered potential 
criminal acts involving the injection of poison into the plastic bottles. Id. at 1091.  The D.C. 
Circuit rejected this claim for two reasons.  Id. at 1091–92.  First, the harmful ingestion of liquor 
that has been criminally injected with poison is beyond the scope of an environmental-impact 
assessment.  Id. at 1091.  Second, the criminal act of a third party does not create an obligation to 
asses an environmental effect thereof merely because the act was reasonably foreseeable; rather, 
the scope of the causal relationship “must be defined by the policies and legislative intent behind 
NEPA.”  Id. at 1091–92 (citing Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 
766, 774 n.7 (1983)). 
 201. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 750 (2d Cir. 1983).  The Department 
of Transportation adopted a final rule governing the shipment of large quantities of radioactive 
material on federal highways, which New York challenged.  Id. at 737–38.  The Second Circuit, 
disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion that the Department should have stated its position 
on the possibility of a sabotage or terrorist act,  deferred to the Department’s judgment that “the 
risks of sabotage were too far afield for consideration.”  Id. at 750. 
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2.  Determining the Risk of a Terrorist Attack: Is it Mere Speculation? 
In an EIS, the agency is required to evaluate “reasonably foreseeable” 
events,202  but “NEPA does not require consideration of remote and speculative 
events.”203  The Ninth Circuit purported to apply this standard in San Luis 
Obispo.204  The NRC determined that the risk of a terrorist attack, such as 
those on September 11th, is unquantifiable and so “[a]ny attempt at 
quantification . . . would be highly speculative.”205  As a result, an act of 
terrorism is not reasonably foreseeable and warrants no consideration in the 
NEPA analysis.206 
The Ninth Circuit and other commentators have disagreed with this 
argument, contending that the NRC is able to effectively consider an act of 
terrorism in an EIS because it has done so in other instances.207  The NRC has 
taken significant measures to address nuclear security in other contexts, 
including a “top to bottom” review of terrorism threats.208  The Ninth Circuit 
found that the NRC could not claim a risk is unquantifiable in one context, and 
then, in another, take credit for assessing that risk.209  Furthermore, the Ninth 
Circuit asserted that the NRC could take a qualitative approach to terrorism 
assessments in an EIS as already done in other contexts, such as for severe 
accident assessments.210 
                     
 202. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a) (2010) (defining “indirect effects,” which must be considered in 
an EIS under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.15(b), as effects that are “reasonably foreseeable”). 
 203. Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 739 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 204. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 
2006).  According to the Ninth Circuit, an EIS “need not discuss remote and highly speculative 
consequences.”  Id. at 1030 (quoting Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 
1026 (9th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Third Circuit in New Jersey 
analyzed the issue under the proximate-cause test and did not address the whether an act of 
terrorism is too remote and speculative.  See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 142 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
 205. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 350 (2002); see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 561 F.3d at 143 (citing GEIS FOR LICENSE RENEWAL, supra note 137, § 5.3.3.1) (equating 
terrorist attacks to sabotage and citing to the NRC’s GEIS, which determined that the risk of 
sabotage is unquantifiable and not reasonably expected). 
 206. See, e.g., Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 351 
 207. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1031–32 (“Thus, we conclude that precise quantification 
of a risk is not necessary to trigger NEPA’s requirements, and even if it were, the NRC has not 
established that the risk of a terrorist attack is quantifiable.”); see also Mott, supra note 175, at 
352 (explaining that quantifiability is not the sole factor used to assess risk); Schifman, supra 
note 195, at 398–99 (identifying other areas in which the NRC exercises control over  
nuclear-facility security to address concerns with potential airborne attacks, and arguing that such 
control therefore extends to environmental-impact reviews). 
 208. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1032; see supra Part I.H (describing new licensing 
requirements designed to address terrorism concerns, which the NRC imposed in the wake of 
September 11th). 
 209. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1032. 
 210. Id. at 1031–32.  The NRC requires that applicants for reactor licenses perform a 
probabilistic risk assessment of severe accidents in the final safety-analysis report.  10 C.F.R.  
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In Weinberger, the Supreme Court noted that the first of NEPA’s twin aims 
is to require an agency to consider environmental effects during the  
decision-making process.211  Expanding on this, the First Circuit in Sierra Club 
identified three factors to consider when determining what environmental 
impacts are “too speculative to warrant consideration”212:  (1) How likely are 
the impacts to occur? (2) Can the impacts be described with “sufficient 
specificity” to make consideration of the impacts useful? (3) Would the 
agency’s failure to consider the impacts now, foreclose the possibility of 
considering them later?213  Subsequently, CEQ has modified the likelihood 
factor by requiring agencies to consider “impacts which have catastrophic 
consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low.”214   
The likelihood factor, when coupled with CEQ’s regulations, requires an 
environmental risk assessment.215  The Ninth Circuit and other commentators 
have noted that the probability of a terrorist attack is significant enough to 
warrant agency expenditure of resources on appropriate action to protect 
against such an attack.216  However, the Ninth Circuit and these commentators 
have failed to consider the effectiveness of these actions.217  For example, the 
NRC’s post-September 11th design requirements and security measures have 
reduced the probability of a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear facility.218  
                                                
§ 52.47(a)(27) (2010).  A probabilistic risk assessment is a methodology to quantify the risk of a 
particular hazard by identifying initiating events that would contribute to the hazard, assigning an 
estimate frequency of each initiating event, and stochastically combining the initiating events to 
determine a total risk.  See NRC: Fact Sheet on Probabilistic Risk Assessment, U.S. NRC, http:// 
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/probabilistic-risk-asses.html (last updated 
Feb. 4, 2011).  Performing these analyses is a complex task involving event trees, fault trees, 
human-reliability analysis, and Monte Carlo statistical methods.  Id.  However, the Ninth Circuit 
observed that the NRC has permitted a qualitative, rather than quantitative, probabilistic 
assessment when the quantity of risk is uncertain.  San Luis Obispo, 445 F.3d at 1031 (citing 
Proposed Policy Settlement on Severe Accidents and Related Views on Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,014, 16,020 (Apr. 13, 1983)). 
 211. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981). 
 212. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 878 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 213. Id. 
 214. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (2009).  The regulations governing this section were amended 
in 1986, subsequent to the First Circuit decision.  National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,625–26 (Apr. 25, 
1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22). 
 215. Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 878; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4).  Risk is equal to the probability 
of occurrence multiplied by the consequences.  See BARRY W. BOEHM, TUTORIAL: SOFTWARE 
RISK MANAGEMENT 6 (1989) (providing a detailed explanation of risk analysis). 
 216. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006); see 
Hill, supra note 177, at 3009–11 (describing some of the NRC’s post-September 11th security 
measures and arguing for inclusion of terrorist attacks in NEPA analysis). 
 217. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1030–31 (describing the NRC’s actions in 
response to heightened terrorism concerns, but not the successful effects of such measures). 
 218. See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 195, at 446 (describing the new measures enacted in the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, as well as the NRC’s increased security requirements). 
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Rather than serving as an independent device, the EIS supplements agency 
actions in the decision-making process.219  Therefore, the efforts of the NRC 
and the other agencies to prevent a successful terrorist attack should inform the 
NRC’s, or any agency’s, determination of the likelihood of a potential attack 
succeeding when deciding whether to include such an attack in an EIS. 
As required by the CEQ regulations, reasonably foreseeable risks cannot be 
ruled out on probability alone because even a small risk could have extreme 
consequences.220  When considering these consequences, an agency is required 
to consider existing “credible scientific evidence.”221  Although there are 
conflicting views, scientific evidence generally supports the conclusion that a 
breach in reactor containment222 is unlikely to occur as a result of a terrorist 
attack, particularly an airplane attack, thus resulting in little environmental 
consequence.223  As a result, the overall risk of radioactive release to the 
environment (the probability of a successful attack multiplied by the likelihood 
of containment breach) is small, which weighs in favor of the argument that a 
successful act of terrorism is not reasonably foreseeable. 
                     
 219. 40 C.F.R. § 1562.4(b) (2010); see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 
139–40 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 220. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (2009). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Reactors use “defense in depth” and redundancy systems to prevent the release of 
radioactive material into the environment.  NUCLEAR ENGINEERING HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 
47.  The reactor containment, a hardened building surrounding the reactor and other systems 
designed to be leak tight, is one barrier to radioactive release.  Id. 
 223. See BACKGROUNDER: NUCLEAR SECURITY, supra note 10, at 3 (“[T]he NRC initiated a 
security and engineering review based on the September 11th events. The review looked at what 
might happen if terrorists used an aircraft to attack a nuclear power plant. The NRC also assessed 
the potential consequences of other types of terrorist attacks. National experts from Department 
of Energy (DOE) laboratories used state-of-the-art experiments and structural and fire analyses to 
assist the NRC. While the details are classified, the studies confirm that the plants are robust, and 
the likelihood of a radioactive release affecting public health and safety is low.”); see also HOLT 
& ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 5.  However, the Union of Concerned Scientists, which has been 
a proponent of increased actions to protect against air attacks, concluded that a terrorist attack at 
the Indian Point power plant in New York would have wide spread and significant consequences.  
LYMAN, supra note 11, at 4.  Yet, the Nuclear Energy Institute, a nuclear industry group, has 
concluded that the impact of an aircraft on any nuclear-power-plant containment type in the 
United States would not breach the containment. NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., DETERRING 
TERRORISM: AIRCRAFT CRASH IMPACT ANALYSES DEMONSTRATE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT’S 
STRUCTURAL STRENGTH 1–4 (2002), available at http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats 
/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/epriplantstructuralstudy (follow “DOWNLOAD” 
hyperlink).  For new plants, the NRC and the nuclear industry have both considered design 
changes and modifications to resist a plane attack.  Westinghouse has modified its principle 
reactor design, the AP1000, to resist aircraft penetration by lining the concrete containment 
structure with steel plates.  HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 6.  Additionally, the NRC has 
issued a rule requiring applicants for new nuclear power plants to perform analysis beyond 
design-basis threats and to consider the effects of an impact by a large, commercial aircraft.  
Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,112, 28,112 
(June 12, 2009) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 52). 
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The second factor from Sierra Club—whether the impacts can be described 
with “sufficient specificity” to make their consideration useful224—lends some 
support to the conclusion that a terrorist attack is reasonably foreseeable under 
NEPA; however, closer examination reveals just the opposite.  The NRC could 
perform numerous engineering evaluations to describe a terrorist attack and its 
consequences with a high level of specificity.225  However, these evaluations 
would not be particularly useful because a terrorist attack could take on a 
variety of forms, with each permutation presenting a different set of 
consequences.226  These numerous permutations could lead the NRC to expend 
significant resources evaluating the credibility and potential consequences of 
endless scenarios with sufficient specificity.227  Furthermore, the NRC and 
other agencies have already taken action to prevent successful terrorist attacks 
against nuclear facilities.228  Although the engineering capability to evaluate 
these different attack scenarios exists, the evaluations would not be useful if 
the results were merely hypothetical, rather than based on some likelihood of 
occurrence.229  When considered in conjunction with the large range of 
possible attacks, and the uncertainty associated with the success rate of any 
given attack, the second factor supports a finding of not reasonably 
foreseeable. 
The third factor from Sierra Club also supports the conclusion that a terrorist 
attack is not reasonably foreseeable under a NEPA analysis when the NRC is 
licensing a nuclear facility.230  Failing to consider terrorist attacks at the time 
of licensing does not foreclose the possibility of considering terrorist threats 
later.231  In fact, the NRC approach to nuclear security demonstrates the 
                     
 224. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 878 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 225. See e.g., supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 226. See, e.g., HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 35, at 90 (describing possible attack  
scenarios—such as air attacks, water attacks, shelling the facility from a distance—and their 
possible consequences).  A cyber attack is another possible scenario.  See David E. Sanger, Iran 
Fights Malware Attacking Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, at 4 (reporting on the Stuxnet 
worm, which is a computer virus aimed solely at industrial computer equipment, such as 
equipment used by nuclear facilities). 
 227. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing worst-case analysis). 
 228. See supra Part I.H. 
 229. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 230. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 878 (1st Cir. 1985) (explaining the third factor as to 
whether the agency’s failure to consider the impacts at a certain time will make later 
consideration of them irrelevant).  In Sierra Club, the federal government, in conjunction with the 
State of Maine, decided to build a causeway and seaport.  Id. at 870.  The court found that failing 
to consider the effects of subsequent development of the area when making the decision to build 
the causeway would foreclose future consideration of the environmental effects of that 
development because after the causeway was built the development would be inevitable.  Id. at 
879. 
 231. See, e.g., HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 4–6 (discussing how the NRC has 
modified its licensing regime in the wake of September 11th). 
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Agency’s ability to assess changes after the initial licensing decision.232  The 
reactors currently in use were designed before September 11th and not 
designed to protect against today’s terrorist threats.233  However, the design-
basis-threat regulations were designed to adapt to new threats and are 
applicable to both new and existing facilities.234  Therefore, each of Sierra 
Club’s three factors supports the conclusion that a terrorist attack on a nuclear 
facility and a potential radioactive release to the environment is not reasonably 
foreseeable under NEPA.  
3.  “Worst-Case” Analysis 
One commentator has asserted that “the risk of a terrorist attack on a nuclear 
power plant is based on numerous feasible scenarios.”235  This illustrates the 
challenge that the NRC would be faced with if it had to evaluate a terrorist 
attack in its EISs.236  Evaluating the various permutations of possible attack 
scenarios ultimately would drive an agency to conduct a worst-case analysis.237  
It is impractical for the NRC to expend resources generating multiple 
evaluations of conceivable, but highly speculative, hypothetical situations.238  
Instead, the NRC would be driven to group the possible permutations into a 
few categories; then perform one bounding analysis for each category using 
simplified and conservative assumptions.  This process is essentially a  
worst-case analysis, which is no longer required under NEPA.239 
C.  The NEPA Process for Sensitive Security Issues 
The second aim of NEPA is to provide assurance to the public that an 
agency has appropriately considered the impacts on the environment as part of 
the decision-making process.240 NEPA analysis is a largely public process.241  
                     
 232. See id. at 5 (noting the flexibility in the NRC’s response to September 11th in amending 
its regulations for obtaining licenses). 
 233. Id. at 4. 
 234. See supra Part I.H. 
 235. Mott, supra note 175, at 352 (using this point to argue that the risk of a terrorist attack 
should be considered in an EIS). 
 236. See supra notes 225–30 and accompanying text. 
 237. Cf. National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable 
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,621 (Apr. 25, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1502) 
(“[O]ne can always conjure up a worse ‘worst case’ by adding an additional variable to a 
hypothetical scenario.”). 
 238. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1988) (citing 51 
Fed. Reg. at 15,620). 
 239. 51 Fed. Reg. at 15,620.  When it removed the “worst case analysis” requirement from 
NEPA regulations, CEQ stated that the “requirement is an unproductive and ineffective method 
of achieving [the original regulation’s goals]; one which can breed endless hypothesis and 
speculation.”  Id.; see also Robertson, 490 U.S. at 355–56 (recognizing that the “worst case” 
regulation was removed). 
 240. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./ Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981). 
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However, this public aspect conflicts with the “need to protect certain sensitive 
information.”242  Those advocating inclusion of terrorist attacks in an EIS 
argue that this challenge is surmountable and should not be used as a basis for 
their exclusion.243  Additionally, the Supreme Court held that a NEPA review 
may be required even though public disclosure of the results would be 
forbidden by a FOIA exemption, such as the exemption for properly classified 
documents.244  Therefore, security considerations alone do not preclude a 
NEPA review.245   
III.  ACTS OF TERRORISM SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED UNDER NEPA 
Addressing the problem of terrorism requires a coordinated governmental 
effort that approaches security in a comprehensive manner.  NEPA is not the 
appropriate vehicle for the level of threat assessment and risk management 
needed to properly address terrorism. 
A.  Aspects of NEPA Render It Incapable of Adequately Addressing the Threat 
of Terrorism 
The NRC should not address acts of terrorism in an EIS for several reasons.  
First, it is unnecessary and redundant.  The rule-of-reason analysis articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Public Citizen246 obviates any need to consider 
terrorism in an EIS.  Furthermore, the NRC already addresses acts of terrorism 
under its statutory obligations in the AEA.247  Repeated analysis in an EIS 
would spread existing and limited resources unnecessarily, in opposition to the 
Supreme Court’s “manageable line” approach set forth in Metropolitan 
Edison.248  Notably, the Ninth Circuit in San Luis Obispo neither addressed 
these concerns, nor recognized the controlling precedent of Public Citizen.249 
Second, as set forth in Metropolitan Edison, a “reasonably close causal 
relationship” between agency action and a potential change in the physical 
environment is the relevant standard for determining whether terrorism should 
be addressed in an EIS.250  As the Third Circuit demonstrated in New Jersey, 
                                                
 241. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 354 (2002). 
 242. Id. at 354. 
 243. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Hill, supra note 177, at 3045–46. 
 244. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143–46. 
 245. San Luis Obispo, 449 F.3d at 1034 (citing Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143–46). 
 246. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767–68 (2004). 
 247. See supra Parts I.A., I.H. 
 248. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 n.7 (1983); see 
also supra Part I.C.1. 
 249. See supra Part II.A.1–3; see also supra Parts I.C.2, I.F. 
 250. Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 774; see also Part II.A.1. 
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the relationship between the NRC’s action and the effects of a terrorist attack 
do not fit under this standard as a matter of law.251   
Finally, even if the Ninth Circuit was correct in finding that the standard in 
Metropolitan Edison does not apply to this relationship,252 the NRC’s actions 
taken to address terrorist attacks at nuclear facilities, combined with actions of 
other federal agencies and local governments, has significantly reduced the 
probability of a successful terrorist attack on all facilities.253  Therefore, the 
government interaction and the criminal notion of a terrorist attack interrupt 
any causal connection between the NRC’s licensing action and make the 
efforts of a successful attack “so remote and highly speculative”254 that such 
efforts are “not reasonably foreseeable.”255  
B.  Terrorism Demands a Holistic Approach 
Terrorism is not limited to just one agency, or even just to the purview of the 
federal government.256  Because of the limited resources at the government’s 
disposal, agencies must be efficient in addressing issues within their scope of 
authority.257  Agencies must be smart when allocating their funds.  Therefore, 
resources should be spent in the most effective way possible to prevent 
terrorist attacks.258  For example, the NRC requires private security forces at 
nuclear facilities to protect against a motorized bomb through various means 
such as physical barriers and access controls.259  These are practical and 
effective means for stopping this type of attack.260  But an aircraft attack is 
different.261  Airport security, secured cockpit doors, and foreign intelligence 
are the appropriate means for addressing such attacks.262  Coordination among 
governmental entities is required to address terrorism efficiently and 
effectively. 
                     
 251. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 136–43 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 252. See supra Part I.F. 
 253. See supra Parts I.H, II.A.2. 
 254. After the Ninth Circuit determined that the standard in Metropolitan Edison was 
inapplicable, the court concluded that “so remote and highly speculative” was the appropriate 
standard.  San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 255. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 140–41 (describing the intervening events 
between the NRC EIS action and a successful terrorist attack). 
 256. See, e.g., id. at 139 (observing that NRC regulates the security of nuclear facilities while 
Congress and the FAA are responsible for securing airspace). 
 257. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 258. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 259. 10 C.F.R. §§ 73.1(a)(1)(iii), 73.1(a)(2)(iii), 73.45 (2010). 
 260. See HOLT & ANDREWS, supra note 155, at 1. 
 261. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Resolution of the Circuit Split 
There are three ways to resolve the circuit split regarding the inclusion of 
terrorism in an EIS.  First, the Supreme Court could address this issue.  
Second, Congress could create a specific exception to NEPA.  Third, the CEQ 
could issue a rule clarifying that assessments of terrorism attacks are not 
necessary in an EIS.263   
Legislation and regulation are better options than a judicial ruling for a 
number of reasons.  First, they both directly involve the public, either through 
communicating with the public during rulemaking or public comment, 
hearings, and lobbying a legislator during legislation.  Second, they both set 
generally applicable rules rather than deciding a case based on a certain 
specific set of facts.  Although this Comment has particularly focused on the 
actions of the NRC, the problem of addressing terrorism in an EIS is not 
unique to the NRC.264  Finally, providing direction through legislation or 
guidance to all agencies through regulation would be more efficient than 
having individual litigants bring an action against each individual agency, each 
of which has a different approach to protecting against terrorism.265 
                     
 263. Rulemaking has an additional hurdle that legislative action does not have because 
rulemaking is likely to be challenged on the same basis as the two principal cases discussed 
herein.  However, a different result is possible because a CEQ rulemaking is entitled to Chevron 
deference.  Jeremy Suttenberg et al., Unresolved Conflicts: How Revisiting NEPA Section 
102(2)(E) Could Increase Efficiency, Simplify Government, and Save Taxpayers Money, 18 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 156, 180–81 (2010) (“Outside of CEQ, agency interpretations of NEPA are 
not entitled to Chevron deference . . . [i]nstead, the court will subject an agency’s  
interpretation . . . to de novo review.”).  Chevron deference is a three-step process.  First, CEQ 
must be acting within the authority granted to it by Congress.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 
255–56 (2006) (noting that Chevron deference is only appropriate where Congress has properly 
delegated rulemaking authority to the agency, and that the agency’s challenged interpretation then 
relies on that authority).  Second, Congress must not have expressly spoken on the matter—
meaning that the statute is silent or ambiguous.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984).  Third, the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is a 
permissible construction of the statute.  Id.  CEQ rulemaking would pass all three steps: CEQ is 
the agency responsible for overseeing the implementation of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2006); 
NEPA is silent on the issue of terrorism; and an interpretation that NEPA does not require federal 
agencies to consider the environmental effects of terrorism would be a permissible reading of the 
statute,  42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).  Therefore, the CEQ action would be subject to Chevron 
deference. 
 264. For example, the Department of Transportation shares aspects of responsibility for other 
portions of our nation’s energy infrastructure that may be targets for a terrorist attack.  See, e.g., 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) (involving the issue of whether a  
sub-agency of the Department of Transportation was required to asses terrorism in the EIS). 
 265. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 752 (deciding the case brought about the validity of 
their rules governing Mexican motor carriers by an anonymous individual against the Department 
of Transportation); Pub. Citizen v. NRC, 583 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the NRC’s 
modifications of a rule governing nuclear power reactors). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although government agencies should address terrorism and its effects 
directly, the NEPA process is not the appropriate vehicle to do so.  Protecting 
against terrorism demands a holistic approach that uses the coordinated efforts 
of the federal government and includes all critical infrastructure266 so that 
relative risk can be considered and resources can be devoted appropriately to 
different potential targets.  As a result, terrorism is not suited for a  
decision-by-decision analysis as required by the NEPA process.  Furthermore, 
acts of terrorism are beyond the scope of the NEPA process for three reasons.  
First, evaluating terrorism in NEPA is duplicative with the obligations of the 
NRC under the AEA; therefore, because it goes beyond the manageable line 
the Supreme Court has admonished, terrorism is not required to be assessed by 
NEPA.  Second, the proximate-cause argument relied on by the Third Circuit 
is the appropriate application of Supreme Court precedent.  Third, the actions 
being taken outside of NEPA by the NRC and other government agencies 
reduce the likelihood of occurrence and success to levels that make an act of 
terrorism “remote and speculative.”  The uncertainty that this circuit split 
creates is harmful to the effective operation of government agencies.  This split 
should be resolved and, in the absence of resolution by the Supreme Court, the 
appropriate mechanism to bring about resolution is a public rulemaking 


















                     
 266. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 752 (involving the FMCSA, which regulates, inter 
alia, motor carriers on federal highways); New York v. NRC, 573 F.3d 916, 917–18 (9th Cir. 
2009) (involving the NRC’s modification of its design-basis-threat rule regulating the security of 
licensed nuclear facilities). 
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